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SUMMARY 
 In this paper, experiences of Korea, Mexico and Brazil after abandoning their fixed exchange rate policies as a result of 
financial crisis are examined with special emphasis on their monetary policies during the crisis and their handling of banking 
sector problems. In all cases examined, it was the tight fiscal policy together with tight monetary policy with high interest 
rate, a credible way of handling the banking sector problems including closing, suspending and buying bad loans together 
with a considerably high international financial support that helped to bring inflation and devaluation expectations down in a 
relatively short amount of time. The conclusion of paper will offer some solutions for Turkey. 
KOREA 
The financial crisis of 1997 in Korea had a devastating impact on the economy, leading to a recession 
with GDP (running between 5-10% before the crisis) falling to negative 5.8% in 1998 and to 
increasing unemployment 6.8% in 1998 from 2% precrisis level. The capital account liberalization 
accelerated private sector borrowings (both direct borrowing by the corporate sector and bank 
borrowing to finance the investments of the corporate sector) which had reached to 33% of GDP and 
that was not sustainable given Korea’s economic growth potential. The problem was high portion of 
short term foreign debt and term mismatch which signaled serious external liquidity problem. By 
1996, the ratio of short term external liabilities to official reserves had risen to 280%. Sound 
fundamentals such as stable GDP growth, high savings rate, low inflation, balanced budget were 
disguising the  structural vulnerability of high foreign exchange risk. .Despite its strong fundamentals,  
Korea’s  vulnerability  to financial crisis stemmed from private sector’s  weak balance sheets.  
Financial liberalization and loose regulations on financial institutions leading them to engage in 
excessive risk taking and concentrating credits on chaebolds (big conglomerates) and the resulting bad 
loans had already deteriorated balance sheets. Then in 1996, first major blow to the weak balance 
sheets came with the terms of trade shock which occurred as a result of decline in the price of major 
exports. Collapse of Thai Baht in 1997 and the suspension of 42 finance companies in Thailand in 
August 1997, collapse of Asian stock market and the resulting decrease in net worth, increasing 
uncertainty, bankruptcies of chaebolds  and the downgrading of Korea’s sovereign rating in October 
all helped  the attack on won which depreciated  47% between October and December of 1997. 
1997  crisis  in the form of speculative attack on won took place in the context of very low foreign 
reserves. After the initial response of  intervention in foreign exchange markets and interest rates hikes 
to defend won,  it was allowed to float  on December 1997. Authorities adopted a comprehensive 
stabilization package with IMF.  Monetary policy was tightened   to contain inflationary pressures, to 
prevent speculation and capital outflows.  
Faced with the financial crisis, in 1997 government realized that unless insolvent banks were 
suspended from trading or closed down the whole financial markets were going to suffer from it. 
Insolvencies due to huge withdrawals of deposits and difficulties  in borrowing from the call market  
and the resulting liquidity shortage  caused 14 out of 30 merchant banks  and two securities and one 
investment trust company to be suspended from trading in December. In addition, the shareholders’ 
equity of two nationwide commercial banks were written down  to a large extent. Later in January by 
subscribing shares government recapitalized them. 
In August 1998, 16 commercial  banks and 4 security firms were banned.  2 investment and trust 
companies were suspended trading and their assets were transferred to other investment and trust 
companies. .Also out of 12 undercapitalized banks 5 were suspended trading and their business is 
transferred to 5 commercial banks under purchase and assumption. The remaining 7 were required to 
submit implementation plans to increase their capital adequacy ratios in line with Basle requirements 
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( Banks whose implementation are not approved will be forced to either mergers or transfer business 
or exit ) 
Faced with problem of  growing lack of credibility of the banking system’s soundness,  Government 
decided to include various type of financial instruments under the guarantee scheme of Korean 
Deposit Insurance Corporation whose debentures were fully backed by government 
The other important problem threatening the whole financial system was the non performing loans 
problem which was worsened by  the economic recession. To solve this problem, government decided 
to swap  the non performing loans with government  guaranteed bonds  of 64 trillion won. Cash raised 
by the issuance of these bonds was to be used to recapitalize the banks and to pay  depositors of the 
failed banks back their money. The deposit guarantee reassured them and there were no massive  flight 
of depositors triggered by closures. This made it possible for authorities to deal with the most urgent 
problems of insolvency and undercapitalization  of banks  and the weakness of supervisory set up. 
Despite all this, the banking sector problems did not  result in major monetary disturbances. The funds 
stayed in the system and  they were transferred from exiting institution to the one purchasing it. 
Relatively small amount of liquidity support was needed from the Bank of Korea  which was able to 
sterilize them through sale of its monetary stabilization fund. 
On the monetary policy side, Bank of Korea took some measures to improve the effectiveness of 
monetary policy instruments. They include, lowering of minimum reserve requirement ratios, a sharp 
reduction in discount window and the introduction of competitive bidding for open market operations. 
Since 1979, Bank of Korea had  adopted M2 as the main intermediate target for  its monetary policy  
because M2 had a stable relationship with price level and nominal income. However, after the  
financial liberalization,  the stability  between M2 and the other variables was disrupted  and Bank of 
Korea has shifted to M3, the broadest monetary aggregate as its intermediate target from  late 1997, 
since M3 reflected the portfolio shifts between  the banks and non financial institutions resulting from 
the interest rate deregulation plan in July 1997 much better than any other intermediate 
target.(M3=M2+CDs+Money in trust+deposit at other financial institutions+financial debentures 
issued+commercial bills sold+repos+cover bills) Bank of Korea also uses annual and quarterly reserve 
money target ranges which are consistent with M3. For monthly programming bank uses reserve 
money rather than M3 because of the collection lag involved with M3. 
As an operational target, Bank of Korea used bank reserves in its daily operations. Main reason for 
focusing on  bank reserves and not on interest rates  is that financial environment was  not mature 
enough i.e especially the corporate sector was  very sensitive to movements in interest rates and also 
because of lack of a short term interest rates which could reflect demand and supply conditions of the 
markets. Since, the interest rate deregulation which was phased out into long term, it took some time 
for interest rates to reflect demand and supply conditions. However, after the currency crisis of 1997, 
with the external financing  difficulties of rolling over  large short term debt, depreciation of won by 
%32 in just two months,  exchange rate stability and its relation to short term interest rates started to 
be the  main focus of the Bank and hence since 1998  Bank started to use, in addition to bank reserves, 
overnight call rate as its operational target (in agreement with IMF). Right after the adoption of 
interest rate as operational target, the Bank raised the overnight call rate to 25%, the legal maximum 
interest rate in December 1977, to stabilize the exchange rate but that did not help further  depreciation 
of won. This time ceiling on interest rate was increased to 40% and call rate was raised to 30% and 
kept at that high level till it helped to stabilize won in February 1998 . However now Bank of Korea 
was facing a dilemma between achieving short term goal of attracting portfolio investment with high 
interest rates and long term goal of  prevention of further deterioration of its export industries which 
required lower interest rates. 
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There was also the practical problem of targeting the interest rate consistent with inflation in the 
medium term because of the difficulty of  assessing the effect of exchange rate movements on inflation 
due  to increased exchange rate volatility following the crisis. 
Bank used trial-error approach to find the interest rate appropriate for its purposes. It gradually 
lowered the rate  within a very narrow range, closely watching the developments in foreign exchange 
market, foreign capital inflows and inflation. As a result of all the measures taken, the call rate which  
was 30% in December 1997 was gradually decreased down to 8% by the end of August 1998. Also 
won stabilized from its December 1997 level of 2,100 won   to 1,300 won per US dollar in  August 
1988, with reserves increasing from $ 7 billion  to $ 41 billion and inflation decreasing  from monthly 
2.5% in 1997 to 0.3% in 1998. 
In short, the Bank focused more on financial market   conditions such as short term rates and exchange 
rates than on bank reserves as it used to do before the crisis. 
MEXICO 
In late 1987, Mexico was facing  140% annual inflation. To solve this problem, government engaged 
in an aggressive stabilization program with wage freeze and administered prices. Exchange rate was 
fixed and became the main anchor of the program starting from February 1988. Between 1988 and 
1994, exchange rates went through several adjustments. In 1989 a pre announced devaluation regime 
where nominal devaluations were set below inflation rate was followed. Then in 1991, they went on to 
a  narrow exchange rate band  with a sliding ceiling. Between 1992-93, NAFTA agreement was in the 
center stage boosting investor confidence. During which peso was fairly stable, remaining in the lower 
half of the band. In  the first 18 months of the program, inflation fell to less than 20 percent but then 
the pace of disinflation became very slow. It should also be mentioned that between 1992-94 capital 
inflow to Mexico was 7 percent of GDP. There were also discussions regarding the appreciation of 
peso together with the growing current account deficit which was being financed by these inflows. To 
avoid the problem of  rolling over a sizable amount of domestic debt at high interest rates and further 
rise in interest rates,  Mexico had a crucial change in monetary policy by replacing maturing peso 
denominated cetes with tesebonos- short term dollar linked public debt instrument in April 1994, 
keeping the exchange rate band  and the base money target  intact. This act itself boosted confidence 
in the fixed exchange rate since it meant  no devaluation to the public. By November  1994,  tesebonos 
grew to be US$16 billion, while international reserves were US $ 12.9 billion,  barely covering 40 
percent of short term public debt  or 10 percent of total short term liabilities of the banking sector. 
Domestic political tension and the decrease of international reserves caused further attack on peso to 
which the authorities reacted by  lifting the exchange rate ceiling by 15 percent. Since this change was 
not supported by any other macroeconomic policy it wasn’t credible and hence, resulted in capital 
flight and US $4 billion loss of reserves. In  December 1994,  since Central Bank was no longer able 
to defend  the peso, Mexico abandoned the fixed exchange rate regime  and allowed peso to float.  
In the aftermath of 1994 devaluation, economic policy was faced with challenge of conducting 
macroeconomic adjustment in response to sharp reduction in capital inflows and to refinance its short 
term dollar denominated public debt of approximately US$ 30 billion dollars  and to maintain the 
solvency of banking sector while protecting depositors.   
In its search for  a  anchor  to conduct its monetary policy, the Bank decided to contain the inflationary 
effects of devaluation and decided to follow tight monetary policy by setting  quantitative targets for 
the growth of base money as intermediate target  consistent with its inflation objective. Needless to 
say, tight monetary policy raised overnight interest rates from 16% in December 1994 to 86% in 
March 1995. Bank  also decided  to establish limits on the expansion of domestic credit but it did not 
always react to the deviation of monetary base from its observed path, especially  when they are 
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considered non inflationary. However, it soon became obvious that  reserve money (and  control of net 
domestic credit) targeting alone could not decrease inflationary expectations,  because banks did not 
hold any excess reserves due to zero reserve and liquidity requirement policy and also  because in 
crisis times, velocity of money becomes  very unstable making the relationship between inflation and 
reserve money unstable. So, in late March 1995, The Central Bank increased  overnight funding rate to 
100% by establishing interest rate floors in open market operations, hence used discretionary monetary 
policy in addition to the rule based one, to prevent the peso from depreciating further. However, more 
than 100% depreciation of the peso, leading to high and variable inflation   and economic recession, 
made it unrealistic to use interest rates as operational target, since it would be impossible to find 
adequate levels given the very uncertain financial environment. So for daily operational target, The 
Bank of Mexico decided to use the average level of settlement balances on banks’ accounts called 
”zero-average reserve requirement system”. The system has 28  day maintenance periods during which 
the banks manage their current account balances at the Central Bank   so that at the end of each 
maintenance period their daily average turns out to be zero. This system is designed to   induce   credit 
institutions to avoid on average overdrafts or positive balances on their current accounts and cause 
them to offset any excess they might have by lending to other banks or borrow from them any 
deficiency they might have. At the end of the maintenance period, The Bank charged an interest rate 
twice that of the 28 day CETES (zero coupon government securities) on all   negative accumulated 
balances. This way banks with positive balances suffer an opportunity cost equal to those having to 
pay for negative balances and hence everybody has an incentive to have a zero balance. There are also 
limits established   on each institutions’ daily positions to prevent the fluctuations   translating into 
upward pressure on interest rates in the last few days of maintenance periods; Limits on positive daily 
balances imply ceilings on  negative accumulated balances the bank can offset based on the remaining 
number of days to the end of maintenance period  The zero accumulated current account balance rule 
implies that The Bank will sterilize the monetary impact of net international assets and from the 
operations that the Treasury carries out in accounts with Central Bank. It should also be noted that 
Bank of Mexico does not have reserve and liquidity requirements which means has only open market 
operations as the main policy tool in conducting monetary policy 
In addition to the tight monetary policy, fiscal policy was tightened  leading to a primary surplus of 
4.7% of GDP in 1995 from 2.1% in 1994. Also  to induce the creditors  to roll over their maturing 
loans to Mexico they negotiated and obtained a US $52 billion  international support package   mainly 
from IMF and the US government. In dealing  with banking sector problems  of fragility, moral hazard 
and systemic run on,  regulation and supervision,  authorities recognized the cost of  banking sector 
restructuring  a fiscal problem and  decided to resort the Central Bank as little as possible, hence  freed 
the monetary policy to pursue its goal of price stability. In line with these objectives, the Central Bank 
opened credit lines denominated in foreign currency at a penalty rate for commercial banks to fulfill 
their external obligations.  
Following these measures, peso  became stable, interest rates fell, international community resumed 
lending,  GDP grew on average 5.6 percent between 1996-98 and inflation decreased  from 51.7% in 
1995 to 18.6% in 1998. 
BRAZIL 
Even though Brazil was  affected by the Mexican crisis and to a smaller extent by the 1997 Asian 
crisis,  real blow came with the Russian crisis of August 1998 and it resulted in $30 billion loss  in 
foreign reserves trying to defend the real. Domestic problems such as elections delayed the foreign 
financial rescue package till December 1998, but they managed to get $41.5 billion by signing a 3 year 
stand-bye with IMF $9.2 billion of which was disbursed immediately, the rest was conditional on 
fiscal adjustment. However lack of progress in the fiscal arena, resistance to high interest rates, capital 
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outflows and strong demand for the correction of appreciation of real  caused monetary policy to be 
ineffective in defending the currency and real was  let to float on January 15 and by the end of 
February it depreciated by more than 35%. The new exchange rate regime necessitated a new 
monetary policy. However, that was quite difficult to do given the financial market conditions and 
unsettled expectations following the depreciation. To offset the capital flight caused by increase in 
inflation following  such a substantial depreciation and to avoid  further depreciation, nominal interest 
rates had to be raised. This issue raised considerable debate. Proponents of tight monetary policy 
insisted on high interest rate higher than  devaluation expectations so as to lift  the pressure on 
exchange rate. The problem was that high  interest rates would increase debt service, increase the 
default chance  and could signal further inflation. 
At any event, the agreement with IMF on March 8, 1999 set two clear objectives and instruments to 
limit the inflationary impact of devaluation: first was raising interest rates and second, to prevent the 
ratio of debt to GDP from exploding by producing substantial primary surplus. The estimated cost of 
this policy on real sector was  around 4% decline in GNP. The short term interest rates after the float 
was raised   from 29% in January to 45% in March. By May 1999 however, the real had risen from 1 
US$:2.21 in March, to 1US$:1.67, short term interest rate had fallen  from 45 percent to 23 percent 
and inflation declined from  annualized rate of 16% in March to 6 percent in April. What’s more, 
instead of going into recession economy grew by 1 percent in the first quarter of 1999. 
Among the reasons cited for such a rapid turnaround was first of all good luck (agricultural output 
grew by 19 percent due to good weather conditions) and low interest rates in US, but what restored the 
investor confidence  was  fiscal action and discipline (collapse of real forced congress to pass the 
pension legislation that was  rejected in 1998 and measures to cut expenditures were introduced ) and 
a sizable international financial help. Immediate results were achieved by the first quarter of 1999 with 
US $5.6 billion primary surplus. 
The Central Bank continued its commitment of tight monetary policy to restrain inflation by high 
interest rates regardless of its consequences. Coupled with the serious fiscal and monetary measures, 
external endorsement of these measures restored confidence (In addition to US$ 41.5 billion in IMF 
credit The World Bank also agreed to give US$4.5 billion to support social spending and state level 
reforms) and by April short term capital rushed back attracted by very high real interest rates due to 
decline in inflation, which allowed the Central Bank to reduce nominal interest rates six times in seven 
weeks without giving the impression that it was giving up tight monetary policy. Also the banking 
sector had a role in recovery, since many banks were expecting the devaluation, they  had hedged  
themselves by futures contracts and by holding dollar linked government bonds. Hence, the  risk of 
banking sector collapse did not threaten fiscal balance. 
Despite the program’s success, reforms that were avoided for more than a decade was not fully 
addressed.  Operational deficit is quite large due to interest obligations. To service the external 
liabilities accumulated during five years export performance as well as external finance is a must. i.e 
program is vulnerable to external shocks. Using the opportunity of economic recovery, Brazil may 
convert the debt denominated in foreign currency to locally denominated debt and may escape some of 
the vulnerabilities to external shocks as was done by Mexico. 
CONCLUSION 
The common factors in all three countries examined were: fixing of the exchange rate to break 
inflationary inertia, excessive credit growth before the crisis, excessive short term foreign borrowing 
induced by fixed exchange rate guarantee, weak banking system and loose supervision. 
 6
In addition, in Korea incomplete financial liberalization seemed to play a role in accumulating large 
stock of short term debt, since liberalization allowed only short term borrowing by financial 
institutions, maintaining quantity restrictions on long term borrowing. 
Among the three countries examined, Korea was the only one with sound macroeconomic 
fundamentals, despite structural weaknesses such as weak corporate governance which made them 
susceptible to contagion.. 
Also in Korea, the attack against won was not a usual currency attack but was driven by foreign 
creditors’ run on Korean financial institutions and chaebolds to collect their loans and by foreign 
investors to exit from the stock market. It was the contagion effect, the herd behavior of the 
uninformed investors who are following the informed ones with a lag that caused the crisis. I 
personally to think the same thing happened in Turkey in November. Had it not been for the East 
Asian and Korean crisis or had that crisis not had the dimension it had, the Turkish crisis wouldn’t 
have taken place. This is a counterfactual statement, but I believe that it is the asymmetric information 
and the uninformed investors who are acting in panic without the knowledge of fundamentals of these 
economies and putting them all in the same basket that causes the so called currency attack and not  
the attack by domestic people. If you would recall, when the Russian crisis took place, many investors 
flew from Turkey and there was no similarity between the economies of two countries. Maybe this is 
the price of globalization. 
Anyway, an important question to be resolved is what is the alternative to pegging the exchange rate if 
a nominal anchor is needed for inflation control. With the flexible exchange rates there is either the 
monetary targeting or inflation targeting left. The experiences of countries that have undergone 
banking crisis show that crisis have significant implications for the short run stability of money, the 
money multipliers and the transmission mechanisms. The truth is that you can hardly target anything 
until the financial markets calm down, banking sector’s fragility and the bad loan problems is resolved 
in a credible way, preferably by leaving the Central Bank out of it  and by raising the money  required 
to buy back the bad loans and to recapitalize the banks by an independent body. 
Is inflation targeting a viable option? 
The first requirement for inflation targeting is that Central Banks should have considerable 
independence. This implies that there should be no indication of fiscal dominance in conducting 
monetary policy. i.e. the Central Bank should not subordinate its monetary policy to inefficiencies of 
the fiscal policy. Public sector borrowing from The Central Bank should be almost nonexistent, 
financial markets should be deep enough for Treasury to borrow and roll over its debt and its inability 
to borrow from the markets should not constrain monetary policy. 
The second requirement is that authorities should refrain from targeting the level or the path of any 
other variable such as exchange rate since, such coexistence would create problems and most likely 
will result in credibility loss. 
An important point to consider is that inflation targeting is introduced when inflation is already very 
low –less than 10 percent. Hence Brazil or Korea can use inflation targeting but it is hardly the case 
for Turkey given inflation expectations of at least 50%. It should also be kept in mind that , the 
disinflation program of 2000 was the only serious program Turkey had,  to control inflation and there 
is no country  who succeeded with just one program in reducing inflation. The experiences of Mexico, 
Brazil, Israel etc. indicate that it is a painful and bumpy road and it may take up to 10 years to reduce 
inflation and many stabilization and disinflation programs. So for the time being, till the banking 
sector’s restructuring problems and the public bank’s duty loss problems are resolved, preferably with 
international rescue packages as was in the case of Korea and Mexico, together with serious credible 
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steps taken for fiscal discipline, (it was this combination which reduced inflation expectations in all 
cases), The Central Bank will have to continue its tight monetary policy and continue reserve money 
targeting (reserve money is cointegrated with inflation in the long run) as was the case before the 
implementation of disinflation program. In this respect, the monetary policy reaction function 
estimated for The Central Bank (See Altınkemer 1998), where net domestic assets change in response 
to increases or decreases in capital inflows, to rate of depreciation of real exchange rate as well as to 
deviation of domestic interest rates from foreign rates, will still be valid in stabilizing the financial 
markets first, then to keep the reserve money growth within desired levels .In the aftermath of the 
financial crisis, injecting liquidity to the distressed banks in the face of declining net foreign assets, 
would increase net domestic assets which would require sterilization and that would mean additional 
quasi fiscal cost as was calculated in that paper. However, given the uncertainty we are facing, till 
bank restructuring and sound macro policies are put into effect, at the moment, it seems that raising 
the interest rates above devaluation expectations, intervention in the foreign exchange market when 
necessary and sterilization is the only reasonable course of action to follow.  
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